There are many events that led up to the financial crisis of 2008. This study looks at the political policies in place before the crisis happened. Focusing on the decade and a half prior to the crisis, the incentives in the financial industry led to risk mitigation. This response to mitigate risk explains, at least in part, a reason why there was a boom in the CDO (Collateralized Debt Obligations) and MBS (Mortgage-Backed Securities) markets in the years leading up to the crisis. JEL: G01, G21, G28
Introduction
The financial crisis of 2008, which officially started in late 2007, had a major impact across the world. The cause of this crisis has been blamed on many different things. Although there are many reasons, people, or countries that can be blamed, this study addresses the events leading up to this crisis that magnified the entire outcome.
John Taylor (2009) claims the primary blame lies with the Federal Reserve's unreasonably low interest rates, which occurred for the decade leading up to the crisis. A Brookings Institute article (Prasad, 2009) says that the world impacted these low interest rates, claiming that it was the world willing to lend to the U.S. that helped keep these interest rates low. Mark Duckenfield, in an ABC interview (Webb, 2008) , blamed deregulation in the United States and Europe, saying "Deregulation and a lack of financial oversight are not exclusive to the U.S. A lot of European countries embraced the free market and deregulation." In the same news story Martin Weale blamed reckless investing; "In Europe, banks were buying what turned out to be subprime mortgages without bothering to check exactly what they were". In addition to those reasons, others are blaming inefficiencies in the rating agencies and the increased price of oil. Although these are all reasons that matter, a majority of the population believes the cause was also a problem with greed: "I think we can sum up the cause of our current economic crisis in one word -GREED. Over the years, mortgage lenders were happy to lend money to people who couldn't afford their mortgages. But they did it anyway because there was nothing to lose." -Pinyo (Moolanomy Blog, September 22, 2008) 1 1 www.moolanomy.com/ When people blame greed they are blaming finance professionals and Wall Street investment banks that were making money on the sales of different forms of mortgage based financial instruments. This study will look at the policies in place before the financial meltdown and discuss how these policies incentivized the banking industry to create these financial instruments. Investors responded to the incentives put in place by government policies, which lead to the invention, or expansion, of financial instruments.
The trading of these instruments is thought to be the spawn of greed; however this study will argue that these are actually the spawn of regulation which established moral hazard in the mortgage market.
This study will expand on the research previously done by Chambers, Garriga, and Schlagenhauf (2007) on homeownership policies and discuss the incentives created in the financial markets. The next section will discuss a brief history of housing policies.
This study is not political and, as such, will address the policies of both a Democratic and a Republican administration in Section three. Section four will discuss the incentive effects followed by a conclusion.
A Historical Look
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Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush's HUD policies
In 1995 the "Blueprint for Reinvention of HUD" proposed sweeping changes. 
Incentive Effects
Secretary Cuomo said that continued homeownership growth would take "creativity", which is exactly what happened. Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae guarantee mortgages in the U.S. and in 1996 HUD set a goal for a minimum of 42% of mortgages backed by these organizations to be from borrowers whose household incomes are below the median income of the area (Roberts, 2008) , "This target was increased to 50% in 2000 and 52% in 2005." The government did not force banks or mortgage brokerage companies to make sub-prime loans. However, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac refused to back mortgages from any company that did not participate in the sub-prime market to a specified level. Therefore these companies were implicitly forced to increase their risky loan offerings. They had to either make risky loans or they would lose backing from Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
After subprime loans were required, banks and mortgage brokerage firms were forced beyond their optimal portfolio of mortgages given risk and returns levels. As portfolios are forced further from their optimal levels, firms must find ways to control for the increased risk levels. This adjustment to policies is not 'greed', it's an efficient response to the policies put in place.
Housing prices had a major impact on the ability to get loans over this time period. Housing price changes and consumer borrowing have been looked at in Poterba (1984) , Case and Shiller (1989) , Stein (1995) , Genesove and Mayer (1997) , Hurst and Stafford (2004) , and Glaeser and Gyourko (2005) . Hurst and Stafford (2004) look at the motivation to refinance, separating out those who pull out equity for wealth and those who pull out equity for consumption smoothing ( Figure 2 shows the U.S. mortgage borrowing). However as this financing became easier, through creative ways of issuing loans, this increased the demand and, thus price, of housing in the U.S. This initiated a continued period of growth in the housing prices that allowed the securitization of housing to continue easily. 1 9 7 8 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 8 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 8 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 4 2 0 0 6 2 0 0 8
As the issuance of creative loans increased, the problem of moral hazard also increased. Several studies have looked at the issue of moral hazard during the securitization of mortgage backed loans (Gan and Mayer, 2006 and Mian and Sufi, 2008) .
Although DeMarzo (2005) claim that 'sophisticated intermediaries' had the ability to value these assets, Gan and Mayer (2006) discuss the agency costs in the market for lenders to investigate the risk associated with these assets. Mian and Sufi's (2008) results suggest that moral hazard is a main culprit for the crisis, supporting the idea that the securitization has had a big effect. As the mortgage debt (Figure 3 ) in the U.S. has increased, studies have focused on the increased default rages on subprime mortgages (Demyanyk and Van Hemert, 2008; Doms, Furlong, and Krainer, 2007; and Keys, Mukherjee, Seru, and Vig, 2008) . Demyanyk and Van Hemert (2008) find that "the quality of loans deteriorated for six consecutive years before the crisis and that securitizers were, to some extent, aware of it." This study provides an overview of the policies in place that influenced this increase in sub-prime lending. Government policies incentivized the finance industry to develop new ways to handle risky loans. The industry responded with the securitization of these mortgage assets to mitigate risk. As these securitized assets increased in volume, the overall perceived risk by any one company decreased, increasing moral hazard.
Although the act of securitization appears to be an act of greed, this has been an efficient response to the government regulations put forth from the Housing and Urban Development, through Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Continued research on incentives, the way they affect the market and ways to make them more efficient, are encouraged.
